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Burning Down the House:
Does Limiting the Innocent Spouse's Right
to Recover Make Sense?
DePalma v. Bates County Mutual Insurance Company'
I. INTRODUCTION
Homeowners purchase property insurance to protect themselves from
fortuitous yet foreseeable risks, such as lightning strikes, poor electrical wiring,
and, perhaps, even arson by a stranger. One risk not anticipated is that one's
spouse would intentionally damage or destroy the family home. When this
happens, is there coverage?2 Traditionally, the innocent spouse could not
recover, but the modem trend has been to allow recovery. Recovery has been
limited, almost without exception, to one-half of the property damage up to the
policy limits or one-half of the policy limits? In DePalma v. Bates County
Mutual Insurance Co. ("DePalma I!") 4-- a case of first impression-the
Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri held that a
homeowner whose spouse intentionally destroyed their dwelling, held as
entireties property, can recover only one-half of the policy limits.5
This Note argues that the court's per se rule of recovery is flawed in two
respects. First, it is inconsistent with the court's claim that the policy language
controlled the court's decision; a straightforward application of rudimentary
principles of insurance contract interpretation-in particular, contra
proferentem-would interpret the policy language before the court as requiring
1. 24 S.W.3d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) [hereinafter DePalma I1].
2. See generally ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 63A,
at 384-88 (2d ed. 1996); Paul B. Butler, Jr. & Bob G. Freemon, Jr., The Innocent
Coinsured: He Burns It, She Claims-Windfall or Technical Injustice?, 17 FORUM 187
(1981); Stephen P. Carney, Spouse's Fraud as a Bar to Insurance Recovery, 21 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 543 (1979); Leane English Cerven, The Problem of the Innocent Co-
insured Spouse: Three Theories on Recovery, 17 VAL. U. L. REV. 849 (1983); Marvin
L. Karp, Arson and the Innocent Co-insured, 22-SPG BRIEF 8 (1993); Brent R. Lindahl,
Insurance Coveragefor an Innocent Co-insured Spouse, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 433
(1997); Rachel R. Watkins, Property Insurance and the Innocent Co-insured: Was ItAll
Pay and No Gain for the Innocent Co-insured?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 893 (1995);
Annotation, Theft and Vandalism Insurance: Coinsured's Misconduct as Barring
Innocent Coinsured's Right to Recover on Policy, 64 A.L.R.4TH 714 (1988); Larry D.
Scheafer, Annotation, Right oflnnocent Insured to Recover Under Fire Policy Covering
Property Intentionally Burned by Another Insured, 11 A.L.R.4TH 1228 (1982).
3. See JERRY, supra note 2, § 63A, at 384-88.
4. 24 S.W.3d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
5. Id. at 770.
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full recovery. Second, the majority recovery rule overestimates one legitimate
concern, the danger of collusion by spouses to profit from arson, while ignoring
others, such as avoiding the punishment of victims of spousal abuse a second
time via court decision, creating a disincentive for an irate spouse to bum the
marital home in order to punish the other spouse, and encouraging insurance
companies to clarify policy language. This Note suggests that allowing the
innocent insured full recovery, unless the insurance company can prove, by clear
and convincing evidence, that the innocent spouse knew that the other spouse
intended to damage or destroy or assisted the other spouse in damaging or
destroying the insured premises, might be a better approach.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On September 7, 1993, Janet DePalma intentionally set fire to the house she
and her husband, Anthony DePalma ("DePalma"), owned as tenants by the
entirety.6 DePalma played no role in starting the fire, which completely
destroyed the house. More than $30,000 in real property and $13,000 in
personal property were destroyed.8 DePalma told the fire investigators that he
suspected that his wife had started the fire because, on the night of (or before)
the fire, he and his wife had an argument that ended with DePalma saying he
planned on divorcing her and keeping the house.9 Seven days later, the
DePalmas' insurer, Bates County Mutual Insurance Company ("Bates County
Mutual"), sent the DePalmas a proof-of-loss form, which DePalna completed,
leaving blank the question that asked about the source of the fire.'0 Bates
County Mutual "expressly rejected" the form for failure to comply with the
terms of the insurance policy." DePalma then re-submitted a series of proof-of-
loss forms and inventory lists-all of which were rejected because of Janet
DePalma's missing signature, among other reasons.' 2 Bates County Mutual sent
a letter to DePalma stating that it would not pay the proceeds until he complied
with all terms of the contract. 3 Never did Bates County Mutual accept a proof-
of-loss form from DePalma.'
4
6. Id. at 767.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Appellant's Brief at 3, DePalma 11, 24 S.W.3d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (No.
WD 57329).
10. DePalma II, 24 S.W.3d at 769-70.
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DePalma sued for breach of contract. 5 In its answer, Bates County Mutual
stated that DePalma was not entitled to recover under the policy because he
never had submitted a valid proof-of-loss statement and, hence, did not satisfy
a condition precedent for recovery." Bates County Mutual moved for summary
judgment, which the trial court granted, and DePalma appealed, arguing that, as
an innocent insured, he was entitled to the proceeds. 7 The appellate court stated
that " "whether an innocent spouse may recover for loss to property owned by the
couple as tenants by the entirety but destroyed intentionally by the other spouse
under an insurance policy issued jointly to the couple"' was an issue of first
impression in Missouri." The courtheld that an insurance policy's unambiguous
language determines the answer.'9 (The court dismissed as dicta the comments
made by Missouri courts and by the Eighth Circuit that the innocent coinsured
could not recover.2") Furthermore, the court held that the policy language barred
DePalma from recovering only if either he or Janet DePalma had engaged in
fraud or misrepresentation regarding the fire.2' Because there was nothing in the
record indicating that either had, the court reversed the trial court.' "Arson,"
declared the court, "does not equate to fraud-something more is needed."' As
a result, the case was remanded for further proceedings.2'
On remand, the trial court sustained DePalma's motion for a directed
verdict on the alternative grounds that Bates County Mutual did not prove
DePalmabreached the contract or that DePalma's breach was immaterial and not
the cause of Bates County Mutual's denial of the claim.' The trial court held
that Janet DePalma could not recover because she intentionally started the fire
but that DePalma was entitled to recover half of the value of the personal
property destroyedin the fire (amounting to $6,788.95), the principal and interest
due on the house's mortgage on September 7, 1993, (the day of the fire), or the
amount of the policy's dwelling coverage ($30,000), plus interest from the date
of the judgment.26
IS. Id.
16. Id. at 770.
17. Id. at 767.
18. Id. at 767 (quoting DePalma v. Bates County Mut. Ins. Co., 923 S.W.2d 385,
388 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) [hereinafter DePalma I]).
19. Id.
20. DePalma I, 923 S.W.2d at 387-88.
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Bates County Mutual appealed.27 It argued two points that were rejected:
(1) that because the "Named Insured" in the policy was Janet and Anthony
DePalma, Janet's wrongdoing was imputed to DePalma, thus barring both from
recovering; and (2) that the trial court erred in dismissing its motions for a new
trial and, in the alternative, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because
there was sufficient evidence that DePalma intentionally concealed or
misrepresented a material fact when he submitted a signed, sworn proof-of-loss
form to Bates County Mutual on which he left blank the cause and origin of the
fire.28 The appellate court stated that the first point was moot, having been
rejected in the first appeal, and that the second lacked support because the record
failed to indicate that Bates County Mutual had accepted a proof-of-loss
statement from DePalma.29 The rejected forms never became part of the claim. 0
Nevertheless, the court agreed with Bates County Mutual's third point on
appeal-that, because DePalma only had an interest in half of the value of the
house, he should recover only half of the dwelling coverage, $15,000, not the
$30,000 the trial court awarded.3' The court reversed the trial court's award of
damages and remanded the case for the trial court to enter an order awarding
DePalma the reduced figure.32
Im. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Fortuity and Insurable Interest Requirements
1. Insurable Interest
To recover under a property insurance policy, an insured must have an
insurable interest in the property covered by the policy.3 That is, an insured
must have a property interest-for example, a fee simple or a leasehold-that the
law requires the owner of an insurance policy to have in the thing insured.34 The
reason for requiring such an interest is to further the principle of indemnity-
namely, reimbursement of the insured for his or her actual loss and nothing
more." If an insured has no insurable interest in the insured property, the policy
27. Id. at 768-69.
28. Id.




33. See generally JERRY, supra note 2, §§ 40-42, at 233-50.
34. JERRY, supra note 2, § 41, at 237.
35. JERRY, supra note 2, § 41, at 237.
[Vol. 67
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is void ab initio, even if the policy lacks an insurable interest clause.36 Indemnity
avoids the creation of moral hazard, the risk that the insured intentionally will
destroy the covered property in order to reap a windfall due to the difference
between the value of the policy and that of the property.37
2. Fortuity
An axiom of insurance law is that only fortuitous--or accidental-losses
are compensable.38 Like the insurable interest requirement, the fortuity
requirement is also an implied term in every insurance contract.39 When the
fortuity requirement is violated, the policy voids coverage as to the person who
intentionally destroyed the property.' The public policy behind the fortuity
requirement mirrors that behind the insurable interest requirement.4
B. The Common Law Approaches to Recovery by an Innocent Spouse:
The Traditional and Modern Rules
1. The Traditional Rule: No Recovery
Traditionally, an innocent spouse could not recover when the coinsured
spouse intentionally destroyed the covered property.42 Courts have expressed
various justifications for the rule. 3 In Matyuf v. Phoenix Insurance Co.," the
Washington County Court of Pennsylvania held that it is implied "by the very
nature and fundamental purpose of the insurance contract ... that a fraudulent
and felonious burning by either of the joint owners who are jointly insured is not
36. JERRY, supra note 2, § 41, at 237. The insurable interest requirement is an
implied-in-law term.
37. JERRY, supra note 2, § 10(c)(2), at 15.
38. JERRY, supra note 2, § 63, at 382.
39. JERRY, supra note 2, § 63, at 383-84.
40. JERRY, supra note 2, § 63A, at 385.
41. JERRY, supra note 2, § 63A, at 384.
42. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Pugh, 286 So. 2d 49, 50 (Ala. Civ. App. 1973);
Fuselier v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 301 So. 2d 681, 682 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Kosior v.
Cont'l Ins. Co., 13 N.E.2d 423, 424 (Mass. 1938); Ijames v. Republic Ins. Co., 190
N.W.2d 366,369 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Bridges v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 252
S.W.2d 511, 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Coop. Fire Ins. Ass'n of Vt. v. Domina, 399
A.2d 502, 503 (Vt. 1979); Rockingham Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hummel, 250 S.E.2d 774, 776
(Va. 1979); Klemens v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co. of Milwaukee, 99 N.W.2d 865, 866 (Wis.
1959).
43. See JERRY, supra note 2, § 63A, at 385.
44. 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 351 (1932).
2002]
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included within the contemplated risks."45 Consequently, there is no coverage
for an innocent spouse.'
Another reason posited by the courts is that, because a husband and wife
had a joint interest in the property, their interests in the policy were likewise
joint.47 In Klemens v. Badger Mutual Insurance Co. of Milwaukee,48 for
instance, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Mr. Klemens's arson was
imputed to Mrs. Klemens, even though she had no knowledge about and played
no role in it, because the nature of the covered property made each insured
responsible, underthe insurance contract, for the other's fraudulent acts (defined,
in this case, as including arson).49 A third reason, advanced in Cooperative Fire
Insurance Ass' of Vermont v. Domina,50 was that, even assuming the
misconduct of the arsonist spouse did not bar recovery by the innocent
coinsured, "nevertheless [the innocent spouse's] interest in the property as [a]
tenant[] by the entirety is such that the extent thereof cannot be determined."'"
Nevertheless, the Vermont Supreme Court acknowledged that disallowing
recovery was outmoded and punitive.52
Finally, and probably most significantly, some courts deem recovery by the
innocent coinsured a violation of the public policy against allowing a wrongdoer
to benefit-even indirectly-from his or her misdeeds. 3 "To allow recovery on
an insurance contract where the arsonist has been proven to be a joint insured
would allow funds to be acquired by the entity of which the arsonist is a member
and is flatly against public policy."' 4
2. The Modem Rule: Recovery by the Innocent Spouse
The modem rule allows recovery by an innocent spouse, rejecting the
arguments adduced for the old rule.5" First, that the husband and wife have a
single interest in the insured property does not mean they, as a marital unit, have
a single interest in the insurance policy; presumptively, their interests are
45. Id. at 365.
46. Id.
47. Klemens v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co. of Milwaukee, 99 N.W.2d 865, 866 (Wis.
1959).
48. 99 N.W.2d 865 (Wis. 1959).
49. Id. at 867.
50. 399 A.2d 502 (Vt. 1979).
51. Id. at 503.
52. Id.
53. Short v. Okla. Farner's Union Ins. Co., 619 P.2d 588, 590 (Okla. 1980).
54. Id.
55. See JERRY, supra note 2, § 63, at 383.
[Vol. 67
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severable. 6 Second, some courts have rejected the "oneness" fiction as an
archaic justification for vicarious responsibility.57 In Howell v. Ohio Casualty
Co.,58 for instance, the court rejected the unity thesis:
[W]e reach this result irrespective of whether the interests of the wife
and husband in the tenancy by the entirety, in the personal property,
or in the contract rights under the policy are deemed to be joint or
several. The significant factor is that the responsibility or liability for
the fraud-here, the arson-is several and separate rather than joint,
and the husband's fraud cannot be attributed or imputed to the wife
who is not implicated therein. Accordingly, the fraud of the co-
insured husband does not void the policy as to the plaintiff wife. 9
Third, the rationale for allowing recovery is that the reasonable insured would
not expect to be denied the proceeds because of the arson committed by his or
her spouse.' Citing the doctrine of reasonable expectations, the court in
American Economy Insurance Co. v. Liggett" held that, if an insurance company
wanted to deny the innocent coinsured the right to recover, it must use clear and
prominent language, such as the following: "IF YOU OR ANY PERSON
INSURED BY THIS POLICY DELIBERATELY CAUSES A LOSS TO
PROPERTY INSURED THEN THIS POLICY IS VOID AND WE WILL NOT
REIMBURSEYOU ORANYONE ELSE FORTHATLOSS."62 Otherwise, the
reasonable expectations of the innocent coinsured, who would consider arson by
his or her spouse as fortuitous, would be frustrated. 3
Fourth, the rationale is that public policy favors allowing recovery even if
clear language of the policy forbids recovery." In Borman v. State Farm Fire
and Casualty Co.,65 the Michigan Supreme Court invalidated a term in a property
insurance policy disallowing recovery when "any insured" intentionally





60. Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. Liggett, 426 N.E.2d 136, 141-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 141 (emphasis in original).
63. Id. at 142.
64. Borman v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 521 N.W.2d 266, 267 (Mich. 1994).
65. 521 N.W.2d 266 (Mich. 1994).
2002]
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damaged the insured property." The court voided the provision for failing to
comply with a state statute. 7
3. Amount Recoverable Under the Modem Rule: Usually Only Half
Though most courts allow the innocent spouse to recover, the nearly
unanimous rule is to limit that recovery to one-half of the amount of the property
damage up to the policy limits or to one-half of the amount of the proceeds up
to one-half of the policy limits." In Lewis v. Homeowner's Insurance Co., 9 for
instance, the court concluded that limiting recovery to one-half of the property
damage, not to exceed the policy limits, was warranted because:
[a rule allowing full recovery would] necessitate reliance on the
"oneness" legal fiction of marital property which we rejected in
determining that the parties here enjoy and assume several, not joint
contractual rights and obligations. Moreover, an award greater than
one-half would allow the innocent spouse to recover in excess of that
to which she would be entitled upon severance of the tenancy by the
entirety, whether by divorce or other action of the parties.7"
The court also implied that allowing anything more than one-half recovery
would run the risk of rewarding the guilty spouse for misdeeds.7 In Delph v.
Potomac Insurance Co.,72 the New Mexico Supreme Court reasoned that an
innocent spouse in a community property state could recover only up to one-half
66. Id. at 267.
67. Id.
68. See JERRY, supra note 2, § 63A, at 387-88.
69. 432 N.W.2d 334 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
70. Id. at 336-37 (quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Molloy, 433 A.2d
1135, 1142 (Md. 1981)).
71. Id. at 337 ("By permitting the innocent spouse to recover one half, we are
attempting to reduce his loss while denying any benefit to the guilty spouse."); see also
JERRY, supra note 2, § 63A, at 388. Professor Jerry has noted:
Of course, where property is jointly owned, proceeds equal to one-half ofthe
damage does not make the innocent coinsured whole; but the difficulty is
apparent where one realizes that paying the innocent coinsured 100 percent
of the damages increases the likelihood that the wrongdoer benefits from his
or her intentional destruction of the property.
JERRY, supra note 2, § 63A, at 388.
72. 620 P.2d 1282 (N.M. 1980).
[Vol. 67
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of the policy limits because she only had a "vested and equal interest" in fifty
percent of the policy.73
There are two exceptions to the majority recovery rule. Where the spouse
who intentionally destroyed the property was insane at the time of the loss, the
"innocent"'74 spouse can recover the full value of the policy.7" In Home
Insurance Co. v. Pugh,76 the wife of a man who had a history of drug and alcohol
abuse, had been plagued by delirium tremens and hallucinations (both visual and
oral), and had been treated at mental institutions, burned down the marital home
after going door-to-door threatening people with a knife.77 His wife was allowed
to recovery the full proceeds.7" Reasoned the court:
[T]he burning of the property by an insane insured does not release the
insurer from liability in the absence of any policy provision to the
contrary. This is because the insane party is deemed to be incapable
of entertaining a fraudulent intent or having a conscious design to
destroy the property.79
Where the arsonist spouse kills himself after setting fire to the marital home
or perishes in the conflagration, the innocent spouse has been allowed to recover
in two cases: American Economy Insurance Co. v. Liggett"o and Hildebrand v.
Holyoke Mutual Fire Insurance Co." Inthe former, Duwaine Liggett, according
to his insurer, American Economy, intentionally had started the fire, which, in
addition to destroying the marital home, killed Mr. Liggett. 2 The court noted
that Mrs. Liggett was the sole owner of the real estate and its improvements as
the surviving entireties tenant, and she also owned all of the personal property
73. Id. at 1284-85 ("Mr. Delph's fraud cannot be attributed or imputed to plaintiff
who is not implicated therein. His [setting fire to the marital home] could only void his
interest in the insurance property.").
74. The quotes are here because, if the arsonist-spouse was insane when he torched
the home, he lacked the appropriate mens rea to be guilty ofarson, and, hence, his spouse
is only colloquially innocent.
75. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Pugh, 286 So. 2d 49, 51 (Ala. Civ. App. 1973);
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dichtl, 398 N.E.2d 582, 586-87 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Baker v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 416 N.E.2d 187, 189 (Mass. 1981).
76. 286 So. 2d 49 (Ala. Civ. App. 1973).
77. Id. at 50-51.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 51.
80. 426 N.E.2d 136 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
81. 386 A.2d 329 (Me. 1978).
82. Liggett, 426 N.E.2d at 138.
2002]
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in the home as her husband's sole heirY This, combined with the fact that Mr.
Liggett could not profit from his wrongdoing (having gone to his Maker),
compelled the court to require American Economy to pay the entire proceeds to
Mrs. Liggett." In Hildebrand, Mr. Hildebrand, after conveying his interest in
the marital home (owned by the Hildebrands as joint tenants) to his wife,
intentionally destroyed the homey Allowing Mrs. Hildebrand full recovery did
not violate public policy because "'(m)ere [sic] family relationship of the
arsonist which does not bestow a property right or other direct financial benefit
in the proceeds of insurance does not bar recovery."'86
C. Missouri Case Law
The issue before the court in DePalma P7-- whether to allow an innocent
spouse to recover under a property insurance policy when the other spouse
intentionally destroyed the insured property-was one of first impression in
Missouri.88 Only in dicta had Missouri courts dealt with the issue. 9 In Wilson
v. Concordia Farmers Mutual Insurance Co.,9" the Wilsons, husband and wife,
had conspired to bum down their home and claim the insurance proceeds.9' The
Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri stated that there
was no need to "explore the application here of the generally accepted doctrine
that in the case of ajoint policy covering joint property, not even an innocent co-
owner may recover if the other co-owner is guilty of wrongful conduct."' In
Childers v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.," the Missouri Court of Appeals for
the Eastern District of Missouri never had to decide the issue, denying recovery
on a separate grounds, fraud by both spouses.94 Recognizing that the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had opined that Missouri would
83. Id. at 145.
84. Id. at 144-45.
85. Hildebrand, 386 A.2d at 330-31.
86. Id. at 332 (quoting Erlin-Lawler Enters. v. Fire Ins. Exch., 73 Cal. Rptr. 182,
186 (Ct. App. 1968)).
87. 923 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
88. Id. at 387.
89. Id.
90. 479 S.W.2d 159 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
91. Id. at 161.
92. Id.
93. 799 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
94. Id. at 141.
[Vol. 67
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allow the innocent spouse to recover, 95 the court stated that Missouri probably
would not allow recovery but did not elaborate why.96
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In DePalma J9' the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of
Missouri held that an innocent coinsured whose spouse intentionally burned
down the home they owned as tenants by the entireties may recover, in the
absence of policy language to the contrary, one-half of the proceeds of the
insurance, up to the policy limits.9" Bates County Mutual made three points on
appeal, and the court agreed with one." The court first upheld the trial court's
denial of Bates County Mutual's motions for directed verdict, judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, and a new trial.'° Bates County Mutual argued that
because the insurance policy's named insured was a single entity (the marital
community of Anthony and Janet DePalma), DePalma was barred from
recovering because of the intentional act of Janet DePalma." The court held
that, under the law of the case, Bates County Mutual could not litigate this issue
because the issue whether DePalma could recover already had been decided in
DePalma 1.1°2
Next, the court turned to Bates County Mutual's argument that the trial
court erred in ordering a directed verdict in favor of DePalma and in overruling
Bates County Mutual's combined motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, or, in the alternative, for a new trial because there was evidence from
which a fact finder could have concluded that DePalma had concealed or
misrepresented a material fact. 3 This evidence, according to Bates County
Mutual, included a signed, sworn proof-of-loss statement DePalma submitted to
Bates County Mutual, which stated that:
95. Haynes v. Hanover Ins. Cos., 783 F.2d 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1986) ("[A] rule
which would impute the wrongful acts of one insured to a co-insured spouse merely
because of the marital relationship is outdated and unduly harsh.").
96. Childers, 799 S.W.2d at 141.
97. 24 S.W.3d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
98. Id. at 770 n.1 (citing Atlas Assurance Co. of Am. v. Mistic, 822 P.2d 897, 901
(Alaska 1991)).
99. Id. at 768-70.
100. Id. at 768.
101. Id.
102. Id. The court noted that "[a] review of briefs in DePalma Iindicates that in
fact the same theory was raised and rejected. The only difference is that Bates County
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the said loss did not originate by any act, design, or procurement on
the party of your insured [i.e., Janet DePalma], or this affiant [i.e.,
DePalma]; nothing has been done by or with the privity or consent of
your insured [Janet DePalma] or this affiant [DePalma], to violate the
conditions of the policy, or render it void.°'4
DePalma also had left blank a space on the form asking for the cause and origin
of the fire.""5 Bates County Mutual claimed that DePalma made these
representations and concealments when he knew that Janet DePalma had set fire
to their home.'O° The insurance policy had a term voiding the policy if any
insured "intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact or
circumstance relating to this insurance, whether before or after a loss.
1 °7
Because Bates County Mutual never accepted a proof-of-loss form from
DePalma, the court held that the misrepresentation argument failed as there was
nothing for Bates County Mutual to rely on to its detriment.'0 8
Finally, the court addressed Bates County Mutual's contention that
assuming, arguendo, that DePalma could recover, the insurance policy forbade
him from recovering more than the extent of his interest in the property.'09 The
policy language provided that "this Company does insure the insured... to the
extent of the actual cash value ... of the property at the time of loss or damage
... nor in any event for more than the interest of the insured.''H  The court
agreed, referencing in a footnote that the "vast majority" of courts limit recovery
to "one-half of the insurance proceeds, up to the policy limits.""' The court
reversed the trial court's award of damages and remanded the case to the trial
court so that a damage award of$15,000 could be entered in DePalma's favor." 2
104. Id. at 768-69.
105. Id. at 769.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 770 ("Because DePalma's proof-of-loss statements were rejected by
Bates County Mutual, they never became part of the claim. Therefore, we find that
DePalma's [misrepresentation or concealment] cannot be the basis for Bates County
Mutual's [misrepresentation defense]." (citing Omaha Paper Stock Co. v. Cal. Union Ins.
Co., 262 N.W.2d 174, 179 (1978))).
109. Id.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 770 n. 1 ("The vast majority of courts which have reached this issue, and
which have allowed recovery at all, have held that the innocent coinsured may only
recover one-half of the insurance proceeds, up to the policy limits." (citing Atlas
Assurance Co. of Am. v. Mistic, 822 P.2d 897 (Alaska 1991))).
112. Id. at 770.
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V. COMMENT
DePalma II filled a gap in Missouri's insurance law. Nonetheless, the
court's decision to limit recovery to only one-half ofthe dwelling coverage-the
majority recovery rule' -was flawed in that: (1) the very term it claimed
mandated such a limited recovery contained a patent ambiguity that traditional
contract analysis should interpret to require full recovery; and (2) policy
considerations favor allowing full recovery by an innocent insured, unless the
insurance company can prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the insured
either knew of the intentional destruction of the insured premises or assisted in
the destruction of the premises.
The primary flaw is the court's blinkered reading of the clause in
DePalma's insurance policy that limited recovery to no more than "the interest
of the insured.""4 The court treated "the insured" as if it meant "an insured
seeking recovery under the policy."' 5 Though arguably a fair interpretation, the
court's definition belies its endorsement of contra proferentem."6 Almost all
courts have interpreted "the insured" as meaning either "the named insureds
collectively" or "the insured seeking recovery.""' 7 Given this ambiguity, the
113. See supra notes 68-86 and accompanying text.
114. DePalma 11, 24 S.W.3d at 770 (emphasis added).
115. If the court construed "the insured" as "the named insureds," then DePalma
would have recovered the entire proceeds, because, at the time ofloss, Anthony and Janet
DePalma, as tenants by the entirety, held the entire interest in their house.
116. DePalma I, 923 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Peters v.
Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 853 S.W.2d 300,301 (Mo. 1993) (en banc)). Peters endorsed
contraproferentem when a contract term is ambiguous: "Ifthe language [of an insurance
policy] is ambiguous, it will be construed against the insurer." Peters, 853 S.W.2d at
302. The Missouri Supreme Court has given two reasons why it has embraced contra
proferentem (at least in cases of ambiguous language):
First, insurance is designed to furnish protection to the insured, not defeat [it].
Ambiguous provisions of a policy designed to cut down, restrict, or limit
insurance coverage already granted, or introducing exceptions or exemptions
must be strictly construed against the insurer. Second, as the drafter of the
insurance policy, the insurance company is in a better position to remove
ambiguity from the contract. As noted by Judge Learned Hand, "[t]he canon
contra proferentem is more rigorously applied in insurance than in other
contracts, in recognition of the difference between parties in their
acquaintance with the subject matter.... Insurers who seek to impose upon
words of common speech or esoteric significance intelligible only to their
craft, must bear the burden of the resulting confusion.
Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., 827 S.W.2d 208, 210-11 (Mo. 1992).
117. Ronald A. Hobgood & F. Anthony Lamb, Recovery by an Innocent Co-
insured, FORTHE DEFENSE: THE MAGAZINE FOR DEFENSE, INSURANCE, AND CORPORATE
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court should have interpreted it to mean "the named insureds." Had it done so,
DePalma would have recovered to the extent of the interest in the property he
and his wife collectively held: the entire proceeds.
The term "the insured" may have been selected by Bates County Mutual,
and other insurance companies because of the common law fiction that husband
and wife were one: 18 that is, the phrase may be an archaic remnant of the
common law. By allowing DePalma to recover only one-half of the value of the
home, the court treated Mrs. DePalma's arson as effecting a severance (though
it did not use these words). But, there can be no severance of an entireties estate
by the unilateral act of either spouse." 9 "Neither has a separate estate or interest
in the land, but each has the whole estate."'"2 Consequently, reading "the
insured" as "any insured" would require DePalma, being seized of the entire
estate, to receive the full compensation under the policy with Bates County
Mutual.
Another problem with the court's interpretation of the phrase "the insured"
is that it ignores the context that indicates that the phrase was not intended to
operate as a limitation on individual recovery, but rather on recovery by the
COUNSEL, July 1993, at 3 ('The unanimous view appears to be that such language is
ambiguous because it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation: 'the
insured' could refer only to the insured seeking recovery, or it could refer to all insureds
under the policy.").
118. See GEORGE W. THOMPSON, 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 1803, at 330
(perm. ed. 1940). According to Thompson:
Estates by entireties are creatures of the common law created by legal fiction
and based wholly on the common law doctrine that the husband and wife are
one, and, therefore, there is but one estate and, in contemplation of law, but
one person owning the whole. It is a peculiar and anomolous [sic] estate, sui
generis in character. Estates by the entirety have no moieties. Each owner
holds the entirety. Each receives per tout et non per my [i.e., by the whole
and not by the half].
Id.
119. See Coffey v. Coffey, 485 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) ("[N]either
the husband nor the wife owning [entireties property] can dispose of the whole or any
part thereof without the consent, agreement or acquiescence of the other."). The classic
expression of this principle of law can be found in In re Holmes 'Estate, 200 A.2d 745,
748 (Pa. 1964), which states:
It is fundamental that once the estate by the entireties existed, neither tenant
could partition (except after divorce), nor terminate or sever by his or her own
conveyance as a joint tenant can do, nor by his or her own act affect the
other's right to survivorship.
But see Fuston v. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 440 N.E.2d 751, 753-54 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding that a tenancy by the entireties can be terminated by the felonious act of one
spouse and converted into a tenancy in common).
120. Peters v. Dona, 354 P.2d 817, 819-20 (Wyo. 1936).
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marital unit, "the insured," that normally would receive the proceeds.
Confirmation can be found in the antecedent language, which provides that "this
Company does insure the insured ... to the extent of the actual cash value of the
property."'' It seems that the phrase is designed to shield Bates County Mutual
from having to award a windfall to insureds who, say, insure a leasehold as if it
were a fee simple absolute (creating moral hazard)." In other words, the
policy's insurable interest clause apparently does notapply tothe case where one
spouse intentionally destroys the insured property without the knowledge or the
complicity of the other spouse. There is a gap in the contract.
The only remaining leg for the court's position is its comment, in a
footnote, that "[t]he vast majority of courts which have reached this issue, and
which have allowed recovery at all, have held that the innocent insured may only
recover one-half of the insurance proceeds, up to the policy limits."'" The
footnote cited Atlas Assurance Co. ofAmerica v. Mistic,"24 which in turn cited
Lewis for this proposition."z  Lewis concedes that "[most cases allowing
recovery,] while adequately explaining why an innocent insured should not be
precluded from any recovery, have been deficient in explaining why the
recovery should be limited to one-half of the property damage (or the amount of
the policy, whichever is less)."'26 In justifying limited recovery, Lewis quoted
the following passage from St. Paul Fire & Insurance Co. v. Molloy: 7
Since '[w]e have regarded the rights of husband and wife [to be]
separate under the contract,... both logic and justice require that the
amount recoverable be likewise allocated,' so that the innocent spouse
be compensated for one-half the damages within the limits of the
policy. Permitting recovery of more would necessitate reliance on the
'oneness' legal fiction of marital property which we rejected in
determining that the parties here enjoy and assume several, not joint,
contractual rights and obligations. Moreover, an award greater than
121. DePalma II, 24 S.W.3d 766,770 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
122. Furthermore, the court's conjunction of "this Company does insure the
insured to the extent of the actual cash value.., of the property at the time of loss or
damage" (an affirmative statement) with "nor in any event for more than the interest of
the insured" (a negative statement) suggests that the latter was not meant to modify the
former. Consider this example: "Learned Hand may eat all the donuts he wants to, nor
shall he go into my closet and rifle through my books." A normal sentence would have
"but," not "nor," as the transition.
123. DePalma 11, 24 S.W.3d at 766.
124. 822 P.2d 897, 901 (Alaska 1991).
125. DePalma 1, 24 S.W.3d at 770 n.1.
126. Lewis v. Homeowner's Ins. Co., 432 N.W.2d 334,336 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
127. 433 A.2d 1135 (Md. 1981).
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one-half would allow an innocent spouse to recover in excess of that
to which she would be entitled upon severance of the tenancy by the
entirety, whether by divorce or other action of the parties. 21
The first claim-that allowing full recovery would resuscitate the unity fiction
rejected in allowing coverage, embracing symmetry as a virtue-is problematic
because, as the Liggett court noted, the very reason for the existence of tenancy
by the entirety is to operate asymmetrically as a shield for innocent spouses,
protecting them from the misdeeds of the other spouses. 29 Further, the rationale
was inapplicable to the facts before the court in DePalma 11 because, as
previously argued, the policy language requires full recovery. The second
claim-that allowing any recovery for more than one-half would hand the
innocent spouse a windfall-is, likewise, inapposite because, at the time the
court was hearing Bates County Mutual's appeal, a divorce court already had
ruled that Janet DePalma would have no right or interest in either the marital
home or DePalma's claim against Bates County Mutual. 130 Even assuming the
innocent insured would get a windfall, there are strong policy reasons for
allowing it.'
A possible justification for the court's decision is that spouses are equals
and, therefore, are entitled to an equal share of the property. Such a default rule
seems reasonable; however, when these equals divorce in Missouri, the property
is not presumptively divided fifty-fifty. '3 The conduct of the parties during the
marriage, which would include burning down the marital home, and the
contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of marital property are two factors
courts are to consider in deciding how to divide the marital property.'33 Because
the DePalma's marriage already had been dissolved, because Ms. DePalma was
not entitled to the insurance proceeds, and because, in general, no divorce court
128. Lewis, 432 N.W.2d at 336-37 (quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 433
A.2d at 1142 (citations omitted)).
129. American Economy Insurance Co. v. Liggett, 426 N.E.2d 136, 140 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1981), states:
The legal fiction of the entireties estate in real estate is designed for the
protection of the spouses and the marriage. It was initially designed to
prevent the individual creditors of either spouse from taking the marital home.
... [It is] a perversion of this legal fiction, designed to protect the spouses'
rights and marital property, to use it to destroy the property rights of an
innocent spouse.
130. Appellant's Brief at 2, DePalma I, 24 S.W.3d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (No.
WD 57329).
13 1. See infra notes 134-46 and accompanying text.
132. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.330.1 (2000).
133. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.330.1(2)(4) (2000).
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need award any property to the arsonist spouse-and is unlikely to do so-this
justification is insufficient to explain the court's recovery rule.
What underlies the majority recovery rule is an overriding desire to prevent
collusion between spouses engaging in insurance fraud.' This rule, however,
creates some perverse incentives of its own in violation of public policy. First,
it mitigates, but does not eliminate, the "punishment motive"of would-be
arsonist spouses. Often, arson by a spouse is an act of domestic violence,
retaliation for the innocent spouse trying to leave the relationship, a tool of
control.'35 An example is Fuselier v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.36
In that case, the police responded to a domestic dispute between the Fuseliers
that had turned violent.'37 While Mrs. Fuselier was being taken to the hospital
for treatment by the police, Mr. Fuselier set fire to their house.3 ' As inDePalma
II, in which Janet DePalma burned down the marital home after being told by
DePalma that he was leaving her and keeping the house, marital squabbles often
precipitate arson. 39 Where there is tangible evidence that a domestic dispute
134. Cerven, supra note 2, at 869 (quoting Butler & Freemon, supra note 2, at
210). The concern is as follows:
The new rule [allowing recovery] is essentially an invitation to collusion and
creates "the virtually insurmountable obstacle of proving both the arson of
one spouse, and the conspiracy between spouses in order to defeat recovery
in the first instance." Thus, in reality, the decision to grant a right ofrecovery
generates some unfavorable side effects.
Id. at 869.
135. Lindahl, supra note 2, at 454-57. Lindahl has stated:
When a spouse bums down the marital home, it is often an act of domestic
violence or part of an ongoing pattern of domestic violence, where the arson
is simply the abuser's current weapon of choice. Domestic violence largely
is motivated by the abusive spouse's desire to control and dominate the other
spouse. Typically, the domestic violence increases when the abused spouse
attempts to assert control over his or her own life. When the abused spouse
attempts to leave the relationship, the abusive spouse retaliates by burning the
marital home in an effort to deprive the innocent spouse of a home and,
perhaps, to force the innocent spouse to return to the abuser.
Lindahl, supra note 2, at 455-56; see also Victoria L. Lutz & Cara M. Bonomolo, My
Husband Just Trashed Our Home; What Do You Mean That's Not a Crime?, 48 S.C. L.
REV. 641,642 (1997)("'[B]atterers often damage property to terrorize, threaten, and exert
control over a victim of domestic violence."' (citation omitted)).
136. 301 So. 2d 681 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (denying recovery to either spouse).
137. Id. at 682.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Morgan v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 829, 830 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1979) (Husband and wife had initiated divorce proceedings and were living
separately when the husband torched the home.); Delph v. Potomac Ins. Co., 620 P.2d
1282, 1283 (N.M. 1980) (Husband and wife lived apart; afterthe wife filed for divorce,
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immediately preceded spousal arson, especially where one spouse broaches the
possibility of divorce, any worry about collusion is probably overblown."4
Sometimes, allowing a full recovery would create a windfall for the innocent
spouse; however, this overcompensation would have the positive effect of
discouraging, if only slightly, an irate spouse from burning down the family
home because doing so would benefit, not harm, the innocent spouse. To be
sure, this incentive effect may be weak, but full recovery also would serve a core
function of insurance-advancing indemnification, broadly conceived to include
the peace ofrmind that insurance companies capitalize on in their advertisements.
Full recovery would prevent an innocent spouse like DePalma-who had made
all the mortgage payments and, perhaps, the insurance premiums, as well-from
falling into a financial hole.
Given the danger of arson to both property and life,' 4' it is ironic that the
court embraced a rule that encourages innocent spouses, often the only ones
privy to the evidence that the fire was started by the other spouse, to become not
so innocent by concealing evidence that the other spouse committed the crime
of arson. Had DePalma first consulted an attorney about his predicament and
the husband set fire to their house.); Short v. Okla. Farmers Union Ins. Co., 619 P.2d
588, 589 (Okla. 1980) (On the day the wife served summons on her husband, he burned
down the insured home.); Jones v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 250 S.W.2d 281,281 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1952) (After dissolution of marriage, but before property disposition, the husband
burned down the home.).
140. See Lindahl, supra note 2, at 459. Lindahl has noted:
The innocent co-insured spouse case ... is uniquely different from other
situations involving innocent co-insureds, because in the case of the innocent
co-insured spouse, collusion or complicity is unlikely. For instance, co-
insured business partners may be more inclined than spouses to commit
insurance fraud, especially in times of failing fortunes. This same reasoning
does not apply in innocent spouse cases where the husband and wife are
estranged and one spouse bums the house to spite or hurt the innocent spouse.
The act by the arsonist spouse of burning the marital home is not intended to
benefit the innocent spouse, but rather to deprive the innocent spouse of a
home and financial resources. Under these circumstances, complicity or
collusion between spouses not only is unlikely, it is patently illogical.
141. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Short v. Oklahoma Farmers Union
Insurance Co., 619 P.2d 588, 590 (Okla. 1980), opined that:
[a]rson is a crime whose threat to the public is general. The burning of a
building not only threatens the financial well-being of its owner, but
endangers the public at large regardless of the structure's current profit
position in the marketplace. Arson has been said to be difficult to detect
because the intended result is the destruction of the premises that is evidence
of the crime itself. In today's increasingly urban environment, arson is a
continuing threat to the adjoining landowners, the public at large, and the
municipality which must combat such conflagrations.
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been told that he could recover only one-half if his wife intentionally burned the
home but the entire amount if a third party did it, he may have decided it would
be better to keep what he knew under his hat rather than tell the investigators
about the argument he had with his wife, how he had told her he wanted the
house for himself, and that he suspected his wife had set fire to the house. The
majority rule enlists the innocent spouse-at least some of them-in a campaign
to hinder the arson investigation. The civil law should not fiustrate the criminal
law. 142
While the majority rule on recovery takes into account the incentive effects
recovery has on insureds, it ignores the beneficial effect of a penalty default
rule43 (allowing full recovery) would have by compelling insurance companies
to clarify their policy language. A simple change from the phrase "the insured"
to "an insured" or "any insured" would have disallowed any recovery by
DePalma.' 44 Given the context of the phrase limiting recovery to the interest of
"the insured," it is arguable that the contract lacks a term dealing with recovery
when there is a case involving an innocent and a guilty spouse. If so, imposing
a penalty default would be especially appropriate where the insurance
company-here, Bates County Mutual-is relatively informed, as a repeat
player, about spousal arson as compared with the insured-here, DePalma.' 41
142. Insofar as lower-class insureds are less likely than upper- and middle-class
insureds to know the minutiae of insurance, contract, and property law (or to know
someone who does), the majority recovery rule disproportionately will benefit the
affluent, in a way that punishes the ignorant for instinctively informing insurance
companies and the police about the cause of the property destruction.
143. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87,91 (1989) ("Penalty
defaults are designed to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to contract
around the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision they
prefer.").
144. See Raub v. W. Am. Ins., No. 98-T-00 15, 1999 WL 1483437, at *1 (Ohio Ct.
App. Mar. 5,1999) (holding that an exclusionary clause barring recovery by "an insured"
if the property were destroyed by "an insured" disallowed recovery by an innocent
spouse); Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crook, 980 P.2d 685, 687 (Utah 1999). This
linguistic change is no longer a real option for insurance companies.
145. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 143, at 98 ("[W]hen the rationale is to
inform the relatively uninformed contracting party, the penalty default should be against
the relatively informed party. This is especially true when the uninformed party is also
uninformed about the default rule itself. Ifthe uninformed party does not know that there
is penalty default, she will have no opportunistic incentives."). Arguing for a penalty
default, in part, because of an insured's ignorance about the term seems to contradict the
claim that savvy, yet unethical, innocent insureds, under the majority recovery rule, will
conceal evidencethat their spouses committed arson. The contradiction is more apparent
than real. For the penalty default rule to work, most, not all insureds, must be ignorant
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A full recovery rule would prod insurance companies to replace unclear
language with clear language, substituting, for instance, "an insured" for "the
insured." Alternatively, insurance companies might adopt the crystal-clear
language recommended in Liggett: "IF YOU OR ANY PERSON INSURED
BY THIS POLICY DELIBERATELY CAUSES A LOSS TO PROPERTY
INSURED THEN THIS POLICY IS VOID AND WE WILL NOT
REIMBURSE YOU OR ANYONE ELSE FOR THAT LOSS."' Without a
full recovery rule, the call to change the language is muted.
A full recovery rule is not free of problems. It would increase the risk of
arson because: (1) faking ignorance about the cause of loss is not difficult; and
(2) increasing the amount of recovery may make collusion more attractive. 147
However, Missouri Revised Statutes Section 375.1312(5) requires that an
allegedly innocent spouse file a police report and cooperate in the criminal
prosecution of the arsonist spouse in order to recover anything, thus reducing the
risk. 4 Because ofthese statutory protections andbecause of the policy concerns
that seem to favor full recovery, the better approach might be to allow full
of the default rule, which probably would be true. The criticism of the majority rule is
that it creates an incentive that works on some, but not necessarily all (otherwise
DePalma H never would have happened), insureds to stymie arson investigations by
concealing (maybe even actively suppressing) evidence that their spouses committed the
crime.
146. See Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. Liggett, 426 N.E.2d 136, 141 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
The recommended policy language in Liggett is probably no longer a live option in
Missouri; the year DePalma II was decided, the Missouri General Assembly passed
legislation forbidding any insurance company from denying an innocent coinsured
recovery if the innocent coinsured files a police report and agrees to cooperate in any
criminal prosecution ofthe other insured. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 375.1312.5 (2000). The
language might be effective in denying recovery if the statutory conditions for recovery
are not satisfied or as an in terrorem clause. Nothing in the statute, however, addresses
the appropriate remedy for the innocent coinsured; it merely refers to the "innocent
coinsured's ownership interest in the property," without clarifying the nature of this
interest or whether it, as this Note argues, should be interpreted broadly where the policy
language is silent on the matter. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 375.1312.5 (2000). The statutory
definition of "innocent coinsured" as "an insured who did not cooperate in or contribute
to the creation of a property loss" also leaves wiggle room for insurance companies to
argue that the domestic abuse victim's acts (including, perhaps, threatening to sue for
divorce and to take the family home) puts her outside the protection of the statute. See
Mo. REV. STAT. § 375.1312.1(3) (2000) (emphasis added).
147. One could foresee a husband and wife conspiring to have the husband bum
down the house and flee, while the wife claims the entire proceeds as an innocent
insured. The wife collects the proceeds; they meet somewhere in Mexico and start life
anew. With the majority recovery rule, this would be a very unlikely scenario.
148. Mo. REv. STAT. § 375.1312.5 (2000).
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recovery even if the policy language clearly limits each spouse's recovery to
only one-half of the policy limits.
In sum, the policy language in DePalma's policy, the court's abbreviated
analysis to the contrary notwithstanding, called for full recovery for DePalma.
The proffered reasons for limiting recovery were inapplicable or militated in
favor of full recovery. Moreover, the policy concern motivating the court-the
fear of collusion-was overblown in comparison to other public interests, for
example, the need to discourage arson, the protection of victims of spousal abuse
from being victimized twice, and the interest in insurance companies clarifying
their policy language.
VI. CONCLUSION
DePalma v. Bates County Mutual Insurance Co. filled a gap in Missouri
insurance law, one that was subsequently ratified by the Missouri General
Assembly. '49 But its limitation of recovery by the innocent coinsured to one-half
of the value of the insured property was flawed. It ignored an ambiguity in the
insurable interest clause, and it disregarded a significant public policy in favor
of full recovery. The Missouri Supreme Court, 5 ' or the legislature, ought to
consider allowing the innocent coinsured to recover the entire proceeds. If either
of these bodies does so, there might be fewer burning houses.
RONALD S. RIBAUDO
149. Mo. REv. STAT. § 375.1312.5 (2000).
150. Only because the codification of the innocent coinsured doctrine is silent on
exactly how the "ownership interest" ofthe innocent coinsured is to be determined where
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